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Abstract 
 
This study uses logistic regression for the development of prediction models that 
distinguish between share-repurchasing and non-share repurchasing firms. The 
estimated models form the basis for an investment strategy, according to which one 
invests on the stock of the firms that are predicted as repurchasing ones. Using a 
sample of firms from the UK, France, and Germany, the results show that this strategy 
generates positive and statistically significant abnormal returns over different 
investment periods that range between 1 and 18 months.  
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1. Introduction  
6LQFH WKH ¶V, open market share repurchases have been quite popular among 
corporate managers. For example, Grullon and Michaely (2002) indicate that 
expenditures on share repurchase programs increased from 4.8% in 1980 to 41.8% in 
2000 (relative to total earnings) ZKLOHPRUH UHFHQW GDWD IURP 6WDQGDUG DQG 3RRU¶V
reveal that share repurchases among S&P 500 companies reached a record $172 
billion during the third quarter of 2007. v.Eije and Megginson (2008) find a 
significant increase in share repurchase activity in the European Union from a low of 
3% of total payouts (1bn) in 1992 to a high of 34% (58bn) of total payouts and 50% 
relative to real cash dividends. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of studies 
have examined among others the determinants and motives of share repurchases (e.g. 
Grullon and Michaely 2002; Baker et al. 2003; Andriosopoulos and Hoque 2013), and 
the short- and long-run valuation effects (e.g. Ikenberry et al. 1995; McNally and 
Smith 2007).  
It is widely documented in the literature that share repurchase announcements 
are followed by significant excess market increases at the time of announcement 
(Vermaelen 1981; Ikenberry at al. 1995, 2000; Peyer and Vermaelen 2009; McNally 
and Smith 2007) which tend to persist in the long-run, hence offering economic 
sources of gain to long-term shareholders (Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996; Chan et al. 
2004). Since open market share repurchases are not firm commitments, they are 
HVVHQWLDOO\RSWLRQVWKDWPDQDJHUVFDQXVHZKHQWKH\EHOLHYHWKHILUP¶VVKDUHSULFHLV
undervalued. When firms repurchase shares in the open market without announcing 
earlier their intention to do so, managers apply an ³HDUO\-DGRSWLRQ´VWUDWHJ\DQGXVH
their inside information to repurchase shares before the undervaluation is discovered 
by the market (Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996). In contrast, when firms announce 
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their intention to repurchase shares prior to any buyback trades, managers still reserve 
the option to exploit any stock undervaluation but lose the advantage of exploiting a 
significant mispricing as the market has already been alerted at the time of the 
DQQRXQFHPHQW 7KLV ³ZDLW-to-DGRSW´ VWUDWHJ\ KDV D VPDOOHU DGYDQWDJH DJDLQVW WKH
PDUNHWLQH[SORLWLQJVLJQLILFDQWXQGHUYDOXDWLRQVDQGLVLQIHULRUWRWKH³HDUO\-DGRSWLRQ´
strategy (Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996).  
Therefore, we investigate whether it is possible to predict those firms that are 
likely to make a share repurchase announcement and apply an investment strategy 
based on the forecasted firms, hence simulating the manaJHUV¶ ³DGRSWLRQ VWUDWHJ\´
whereby we can potentially exploit significant stock mispricings.1 Andriosopoulos et 
al. (2012) strive to develop a model for the classification of firms as repurchasing and 
non-repurchasing ones. However, they do not examine whether such a model can 
form the basis for an investment strategy. 2  As mentioned in Powell (2001) 
predictability does not imply that abnormal returns can be earned since the market 
may beat the prediction model, with predictability and zero abnormal returns being 
perfectly consistent. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to empirically test 
and establish whether it is feasible to ³EHDW WKH PDUNHW´ by investing in the firms 
predicted as those being more likely to make a share repurchase announcement. In 
other words, in this research paper we examine whether the identification of firms that 
are likely to announce an open market share repurchase, and the subsequent 
                                                             
1
 Our study is not the first to investigate whether abnormal returns can be earned from the prediction of 
important corporate events. Katz et al. (1985) examine the usefulness of bankruptcy prediction models 
in investment strategies, while other recent studies focus on the prediction of takeovers (e.g. Powell 
2001; Ouzounis et al. 2009). However, a model specifically designed for open market share 
repurchases is necessary for at least two reasons. First, the results of the bankruptcy and takeover 
studies are mixed. Second, there are important differences between those corporate events, leading to 
differences in the PRGHOV¶SUHGLFWLYHDELOLW\DQGWKHPDUNHWUHDFWLRQWRVXFKDQQRXQFHPHQWVDQGHYHQWV 
2
 Another drawback of the study by Andriosopoulos et al. (2012) is that cross-validation resampling 
technique that they use, does not allow them to examine the out-of-time performance of their model. 
However, testing the model simultaneously out of sample and out of time is crucial when one aims to 
use it in the context of an investment strategy.   
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construction of portfolios that include the stock of these firms, could form the basis 
for a profitable investment strategy. 
We follow a two-step analysis. First, we use logistic regression to develop a 
classification prediction model that distinguishes between share-repurchasing and 
non-share repurchasing firms. Then, we form portfolios and examine whether they 
can beat the market. The results of the first stage could be of particular use to 
managers in two ways. First, it enables managers to predict the actions of peer firms. 
Second, it helps managers to identify those firms that are more likely to mimic their 
corporate decisions and announcements such as in our case, open market share 
repurchase announcements. The results of the second stage would be of interest to 
portfolio managers and investors.   
For the first step of our analysis, our estimation sample consists of 465 UK, 
French, and German firms that announced a share repurchase between 1997 and 2005, 
matched by country and year with a control sample of non-repurchasing firms. The 
holdout sample includes 91 repurchasing firms and 2,285 non-repurchasing ones, 
operating in the three countries during 2006. We build three country-specific 
prediction models (i.e. one for each country), and a general one (i.e. using pooled 
data). Our results show that the prediction ability of the models in the holdout sample 
ranges between 66.3% (Germany) and 81.55% (UK). 
For the second step of our analysis, as recommended by Barber and Lyon (1997) 
and Kothari and Warner (1997), and consistent with Powell (2001) and Ouzounis et 
al. (2009), we calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The portfolios are formed on 
January 2, 2006 and we examine their performance over alternative investment 
horizons (i.e. 1 to 18 months). We find that on aggregate, the UK portfolio shows a 
moderate abnormal performance of 1.28% for the first three months, whereas the 
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portfolios comprised of French and German firms show a significantly higher 
performance (8.84% and 4.12% respectively) over the same time frame. Moreover, 
the average performance of the pooled portfolios remains positive and significant 
(8.63%) across the 18-month holding period. Finally, when classifying our buy-and-
hold portfolios relative to size and market-to-book ratios we find that the portfolios 
comprised of smaller firms and lower market-to-book ratios have significantly high 
abnormal returns across the 18-month holding period of 8.54% and 18.99% 
respectively.  
Finally, we assess whether the efficient market hypothesis has an impact on 
the performance of our portfolios by employing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology. The results show that the average idiosyncratic risk of the post-ranking 
portfolios has some explanatory power on the portfolio returns. In addition, we find 
that firm-specific characteristics, that are well established in the literature, such as the 
payment of dividends, firm size and excess cash have a strong and consistent 
explanatory ability on the performance of the portfolios comprised of firms classified 
as repurchasing firms by our models.  
Overall, the results show that based on the firms predicted to make share 
repurchase announcement, hence signaling their potential undervaluation, it is 
possible to devise a successful and profitable portfolio strategy. Moreover, the results 
on the country-specific portfolios show that the excess returns differ significantly 
across countries. This is due to the fact that three countries differ significantly in 
terms countries in terms of institutional settings, taxation of dividends and capital 
gains (Alzahrani and Lasfer 2012; and v.Eije and Megginson 2008), and regulatory 
and corporate governance frameworks, such as law enforcement levels, shareholder 
ownership, and shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 1997, 1999; and Morck et al. 
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2005) that lead to different information asymmetries and shareholder behavior 
towards market signals such as open market share repurchase announcements 
 The rest of the paper is as follows. Section two provides a background 
discussion of the abnormal returns literature that is associated with share repurchase 
programmes. Section three presents the data and the methodological framework. 
Section four discusses the results, and Section five concludes.  
2. Background discussion on share repurchases and abnormal returns  
Ikenberry at al. (1995) find in the U.S. that repurchasing firms outperform the 
market by an average of approximately 12% over a four year period following the 
announcement of an open market share repurchase programme. For high book-to-
market firms however, they find a significant underreaction of approximately 45%. 
Similarly, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find a significant cumulative average 
abnormal return of 24.25% for the 48 months following an open market share 
repurchase announcement. In Canada, McNally and Smith (2007) report a cumulative 
abnormal return of approximately 11.7% for the 36 months following the share 
repurchase announcement, whereas Ikenberry at al. (2000) report a cumulative 
abnormal return of 21.4% for the 36 months after the share repurchase announcement, 
roughly a monthly average abnormal return of 0.6%.  
However, there are significant institutional and regulatory differences between 
the U.S. and the European markets. This leads to different ownership structures 
(Morck et al. 2005) and consequently different agency costs and respective 
managerial motives for announcing an open market share repurchase. Furthermore, 
there exist significant differences on the levels of information asymmetries, legislative 
regime and respective investor protection, and corporate culture even between 
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different European countries (Bartram et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2002), which lead to different levels of market reaction on the announcement of 
intention to repurchase shares in the open market (Andriosopoulos and Lasfer 2014; 
Manconi et al. 2013). Therefore, the effects of share repurchases could vary 
significantly across countries and consequently managers will have different 
managerial attitudes towards shareholder value maximisation.  
For instance, in France firms tend to be family owned, and in Germany firms 
tend to be more closely held (Morck et al. 2005) compared to the typically more 
widely held U.K. firm. Therefore, open market share repurchases would be most 
likely treated unreceptively. In contrast, in common law countries like the U.K. and 
the U.S., share repurchases should be more popular since managers are primarily 
concerned with maximising shareholder value (Brounen et al. 2004) and share 
repurchase can be used to achieve this purpose (Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996) while 
reducing potential agency costs. This is in line with Brounen et al. (2004), where they 
find that German and French companies are less interested in maximising shareholder 
value compared to U.K. firms. Therefore, we expect to find a higher post-
announcement performance in the U.K. compared to France and Germany, due to the 
higher information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, the respective long-term performance of firms announcing their 
intention to repurchase shares in the open market could also vary significantly from 
the long-term performance reported in Canada and the U.S. However, the long-term 
performance of firms announcing their intention to repurchase their shares in Europe 
has been scarcely addressed in the literature. Lasfer (2005) reports a cumulative 
abnormal return of approximately 3% for the UK for the time period of [+3 to +151] 
days following the share repurchase announcement. However, Rau and Vermaelen 
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(2002) find no evidence in the U.K. that firms which make open market share 
repurchase announcements earn significant positive long-horizon abnormal returns. 
Nevertheless, Oswald and Young (2004) revisit the Rau and Vermaelen (2002) study 
and replicate their estimations by employing, for the same date range two samples, 
one from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) (as in Rau and Vermaelen 2002), and 
a second sample collected from a number of sources such as the London Stock 
Exchange Regulatory News Service and The Financial Times. When analyzing the 
long-term performance however, they find that both samples experience positive 
abnormal returns for the one year period following the repurchase announcement. 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) investigate whether it can be a profitable 
investment strategy to invest around the announcement of a fixed-price tender offer 
repurchase programme. They find that it is possible to gain an abnormal return of 
approximately 9% during the period of the announcement and approximately 23% for 
the 24 months following the announcement. Nevertheless, tender-offers vary from 
open market share repurchases in the main follow ways. First, tender offers are firm 
commitments as opposed to open market repurchases. Second, in the time frame in 
which the two repurchase methods are executed and completed 3 . Third, in the 
premium which firms pay the shareholders for tendering their shares in a short period 
of time (Masulis 1980; and Comment and Jarrell 1991; report a premium of 16% 
whereas Peyer and Vermaelen 2005; report a premium of 7% for tender offers) as 
                                                             
3
 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) investigate the implementation of open market share repurchase 
programs in the U.S. market and find that firms repurchase either a substantial fraction of the 
announced shares or almost none at all. Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that firms make the 
announcement but not repurchase because the firm has already attracted the wanted scrutiny from the 
market. This is supported by Chan et al. 2007, who find that firms repurchasing their shares during the 
first year of the year of the repurchase announcement, experience lower abnormal returns compared to 
firms that do not repurchase their shares. Hence arguing that firms do not repurchase their shares 
because the market has reacted quickly to the signal and therefore the firm cannot take advantage of an 
undervalued price. 
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opposed to open market share repurchases which take place at the current market 
prices.  
However, this research study focuses on the open market share repurchases and 
the abnormal returns that can be gained following the announcement of intention to 
repurchase shares, an area that has not been thoroughly investigated. Subsequently, 
we formulate the following two hypotheses. First, we hypothesise that by employing a 
simple method that does not require a sophisticated analysis and has a low risk it is 
possible to develop a buy-and-hold strategy of portfolios consisting of firms that have 
made an open market share repurchase announcement and gain positive post-
announcement abnormal returns. Second, we hypothesise that by successfully 
predicting which firms are more likely to announce an open market share repurchase 
and trade these shares at the beginning of the year of the forecasted announcement 
will constitute a profitable investment strategy. 
3. Data and Methodology   
3.1. Data 
To build our sample, we first identify all the announcements of intention to 
repurchase ordinary shares in the open market of France, Germany and the UK, using 
news articles posted in Perfect Analysis and Factiva databases from 1st January 1997 
until 31st December 2006.4 Then, information on the share prices and accounting data 
were obtained from DataStream and Worldscope. Once we exclude firms with 
missing data, we obtain a sample of 556 repurchasing firms.  
                                                             
4
 The study focuses on this period because it was not until 1998 that share repurchasing was allowed to 
take place more freely in both Germany and France. The Perfect Analysis and Factiva databases report 
any news announcements that were available in the press made by UK and European firms. Only firms 
that announced their intention to repurchase ordinary shares were included in the sample. The list of 
repurchasing firms that formed our starting basis was initially used in the study of Andriosopoulos and 
Hoque (2013).  
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  To obtain more precise parameter estimates, we use a state-based estimation 
sample. Each repurchasing firm with available data is matched by country and year 
with a domestic non-repurchasing firm that did not announce a share repurchase 
announcement between 1997 and 2005. Consequently, the three country-specific 
logistic regression models are estimated using 380 firm (UK), 292 firms (France), and 
258 firms (Germany), whereas the general model is estimated using the pooled sample 
of 930 firms. Following the arguments of Palepu (1986) all firms listed on the 
corresponding stock exchanges as at the 2nd of January 2006 are considered for 
inclusion in the holdout sample. Once, we exclude firms with missing data, we obtain 
a sample of 91 repurchasing firms and 2,285 non-repurchasing ones. A breakdown of 
this sample by country is given in Table 1, Panel A.   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Logistic regression model 
We employ a standard logit model methodology in order to identify the firm-specific 
characteristics with discriminatory ability. The variables that are employed in our 
estimations are selected based on the prevailing hypotheses that underlie share 
repurchases and are commonly used in the existing literature. In the discussion that 
follows we briefly outline those variables and the rationale for their inclusion in the 
present study. The correlation coefficients are provided in Table 1, Panel B. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Firms may decide to distribute their excess cash back to their shareholders via 
cash dividends or share repurchases in the open market. However, open market share 
repurchases can be considerably more flexible as a payout method compared to 
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dividends, and existing evidence suggests that firms are more likely to repurchase 
their stock when they have high cash flows and low investment opportunities (Dittmar 
2000; Mitchell and Dharmawan 2007). As in Dittmar (2000), to proxy for excess cash 
we use the ratio of net operating income before taxes and depreciation to total assets 
at the year-end prior to the repurchase announcement (Cash Flow).  
FRU FDSWXULQJ ERWK D ILUP¶V JURZWK RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG H[FHVV FDVK IORZ ZH
follow Opler and Titman (1993) and construct a dummy variable that takes the value 
RIRQHIRUILUPVWKDWKDYHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\ORZ7RELQ¶Vq (lower than the median q of a 
ILUP¶V UHVSHFWLYH LQGXVWU\ IRU HDFK UHVSHFWLYH\HDU DQGKLJKFDVK IORZ KLJKHU WKDQ
the median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value of zero 
otherwise (FCF Dummy).  
Chen and Wang (2012) argue that firms that repurchase more shares following 
their announcement to do so will be more likely to have lower cash balances and 
increased leverage, resulting to financial constraints and liquidity issues. Therefore, 
repurchasing firms with financial constraints should have lower stock performance 
following repurchases. In order to control for the impact of financial constraint on 
fLUPV¶GHFLVLRQ WRPDNHDVKDUHUHSXUFKDVHZH use the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index (financial constraint), which is estimated as in Chen and Wang (2012) 
For investigating the impact of undervaluation on the likelihood to announce an 
open market share repurchase, we follow Ikenberry et al. (1995), Ikenberry et al. 
(2000), Barth and Kasznik (1999), and Dittmar (2000), and we include as a proxy for 
potential undervaluation the market-to-book ratio at the year-end prior to share 
repurchase announcement (MKBK). Alternatively, in the spirit of Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) and Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013) we control for potential 
undervaluation by employing the pre-repurchase share price returns for a number of 
12 
 
time intervals. In particular, we use the 6-month (days -151 to 2 days) market adjusted 
stock returns.5Gong et al (2008) argue that managers undertaking share repurchases 
IRUUHDVRQVRWKHUWKDQVLJQDOLQJWKHLUILUPV¶PLVSULFLQJKDYHWKHLQFHQWLYHWRGHIODWH
WKHLUILUP¶VVKDUHSULFHSULRUWRDVKDre repurchase. This can be achieved by managing 
the pre-repurchase reported earnings, which could lower the share price prior to the 
share repurchases resulting to buying the share at a bargain price. Gong et al (2008) 
find evidence suggesting that abnormal accruals, used as a proxy for earnings 
management, are significantly associated with actual share repurchases. Therefore, we 
control for the impact of pre-repurchase announcement earnings management on the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRPDNHDVKDUHrepurchase announcement. We include 
the variable abnormal accruals estimated as in Gong et al. (2008). 
The decision to distribute excess capital as a payout to shareholders through a 
share repurchase UHGXFHVDILUP¶VHTXLW\FDSLWDOZKLFKLQWXUQLQFUHDVHVLWVOHYHUDJH
ratio. Consequently, Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue 
that a share repurchase programmeGLVSOD\VWKHPDQDJHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHWRHPSOR\GHEW
instead of equity, so that they can approach their target leverage ratio. Indeed, a 
number of empirical studies report evidence that firms with low leverage are more 
likely to repurchase their shares (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Mitchell and Dharmawan 
2007; Dittmar 2000). Therefore, to proxy for leverage we use the ratio of total debt to 
total assets at the year-end prior to the repurchase announcement (Leverage).  
Vermaelen (1981) argues that smaller firms are more likely to have higher 
information asymmetries, since they get less scrutinised by analysts and the media. 
Consequently, smaller firms are more likely to be misvalued, which leads to a greater 
                                                             
5
 We replicate our estimations by using alternatively the market-adjusted returns during the  one-year 
period prior to the announcement (days -261 to -2) and WKH VPDOOHU WLPHIUDPHV í WR í GD\V (2 
PRQWKV DQG í WR í GD\V  GD\V SULRU WR WKH DQQRXQFHPHQW RI LQWHQWLRQ WR UHSXUFKDVH ,Q DOO
cases, the results remain the same. 
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likelihood of repurchasing their shares. In line with this argument, are the findings of 
Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) who find that firms which are small and announce 
their intention to repurchase a large fraction of their outstanding capital, have a 
significant signalling impact. In addition, Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely 
(2002), and Ikenberry et al. (1995) report evidence that size has a positive relationship 
with the volume of share repurchases. Hence, size is a firm specific characteristic, 
which can have a significant impact on the likelihood to announce an open market 
share repurchase. To capture the impact of size on the repurchasing decision we use 
WKH QDWXUDO ORJDULWKP RI D ILUP¶V WRWDO DVVHWV DW WKH \HDU-end prior to the share 
repurchase announcement (Size).  
Typically, capital gains tax rate is lower than the respective personal income tax 
rate. Therefore, share repurchases can have a significant advantage over cash 
dividends, from a tax perspective. Within this context, the personal tax savings 
hypothesis, states that share repurchases can be more tax efficient and more beneficial 
to shareholders, compared to cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely 2002). While 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and Dittmar (2000) find no evidence of taxation having a 
significant impact on corporate payouts, a number of research studies do find 
evidence of tax having a significant inflXHQFHRQILUPV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJRQSD\RXWV
and of the market having a favorable reaction due to the tax impact (Masulis 1980; 
Grullon and Michaely 2002). Furthermore, open market share repurchases can have 
advantages relative to cash dividends such as tax differential and that they do not pose 
a commitment to the firm. Therefore, open market share repurchases can be 
considered to be substitutes to cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely 2002). 
ConsequentlyZHDVVXPHWKDWD ILUP¶VSD\PHQWRIGLYLGHQGVFDQKDYe a significant 
GLVFULPLQDWRU\ DELOLW\ WKDW ZLOO KHOS GHWHUPLQH D ILUP¶V SURSHQVLW\ WR DQQRXQFH DQ
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open market share repurchase. We follow Dittmar (2000) and Jagannathan and 
Stephens (2003), and we employ the proxy variable Dividend Payout, which is 
defined as the ratio of total regular cash dividends relative to net income. 
Additionally, for incorporating the tax impact in our models, we follow McNally 
(1999) and we proxy for the average tax rate with the proxy variable Dividend Yield, 
which is the dividend yield ratio. 
Finally, IRU FDSWXULQJ WKH HIIHFW WKDW D ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\ DQG RSHUDWLQJ
performance has on the likelihood to announce and open market share repurchase, we 
follow Grullon and Michaely (2004) and we use the ratio of net income to total assets 
(ROA). We expect to find that the higher the profitability the more available resources 
a firm will have and consequently more likely to announce an open market share 
repurchase for distributing the excess cash back to its shareholders. Consequently, a 
higher profitability will lead to a higher market reaction on the buyback 
announcement and a more positive share price performance following the 
DQQRXQFHPHQWGXHWRWKHPDUNHW¶VDQWLFLSDWLRQRIDVXVWDLQDEOHKLJKSURILWDELOLW\  
3.2.2. Portfolios construction  
The logistic regression model described in the previous section is estimated 
using data over the period 1997-2005. Then, the estimated parameters are used to test 
the forecasting ability of the model in 2006. To account for potential country-level 
effects, and test the robustness across alternative approaches, we develop three 
country-specific prediction models (i.e. one for each country), and a general one (i.e. 
using pooled data). In each case, the shares of all the firms that the model identifies as 
share-repurchasing ones (correctly or not) are included in the corresponding portfolio. 
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Thus, we assume that the portfolios are formed on 1 January 2006, and we examine 
various investment n-month horizons up to 18 months.6  
As recommended by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997), 
and consistent with Powell (2001) and Ouzounis et al. (2009), we calculate buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. We estimate the logarithmic return based on the dividend 
adjusted prices of each stock. Then, to form the basis for the construction of a 
hypothetical benchmark portfolio we estimate the dividend adjusted logarithmic 
returns for the respective industry index j of each firm i, based on the two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  The difference between the firm-
specific and industry-specific returns, provide the market-adjusted return for each firm 
in our sample.  
Following earlier studies the abnormal performance is defined as the cross-
sectional average of the individual buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (see e.g. 
Barber et al. 1999; Powell 2004; Ouzounis et al. 2009). This allows us to adjust the 
returns for survivorship bias. Thus, the benchmark-adjusted BAHAR for a portfolio p 
of N firms over a holding of T, as follows:  
¦
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The monthly performance (Ri,T and Rc,T) is computed as the ratio between the 
month-end value (stock SULFH RU LQGH[ YDOXH DQG WKH SUHYLRXV PRQWK¶V UHVSHFWLYH
value (adjusted for dividends). T denotes the number of months of each investment 
                                                             
6
 We do not employ longer time-horizons as longer horizons clash with the 2007-09 financial crisis 
which would contaminate and distort our results.  
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period within which the returns are compounded monthly. The statistical significance 
of the portfolio BAHAR is tested using the established t-statistic procedure.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Logistic regressions  
Table 3, Panel A presents the logit model coefficient estimates. For each 
country as well as for the pooled model, we develop two specifications. The first 
specification, in Panel A, corresponds to a base model that does not incorporate 
information about financial constraints, prior returns, and abnormal accruals. These 
variables are then added in the second specification.7  
The results show that size appears to have a positive impact on the probability 
of a repurchase. This is robust across both specifications and for all the countries, as 
well as in the case of the pooled model. With the exception of the UK, dividend 
payout is also positive and statistically significant. Other than that we observe that the 
factors that influence the probability of a repurchase may vary among countries. 
Furthermore, the three variables that we add in the second specification do not have a 
robust impact on the probability of a repurchase. More detailed, our abnormal 
accruals indicator is statistically significant only in the case of the UK, and our proxy 
for prior returns is statistically significant only in the case of France.   
Of particular importance in our setting is whether the model is able to 
differentiate between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. So, we now turn to 
the classification and prediction ability of the models, presented in Table 3, Panel B. 
Looking at the training sample, the results are satisfactory with the average 
                                                             
7
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for recommending the estimation of the second 
specification. Due to missing data, the estimation sample for this specification includes 124 UK firms, 
84 French firms, and 54 German firms. The corresponding figures for the holdout sample are: 719 
(UK), 384 (France), and 349 (Germany).  
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classification accuracy exceeding 70% in most of the cases, regardless of the 
specification. 
However, what really matters for a successful investment strategy is the 
predictive ability of the models in the holdout sample. In the case of Specification 1, 
the results in the holdout sample confirm the prediction ability of the models, with the 
average correct classification accuracies ranging between 66.3% in the case of 
Germany to 81.55% in the case of the UK. The model that uses the pooled data also 
performs well classifying correctly 77.35% of the firms, on average. Interestingly 
enough, all the models achieve quite balanced accuracies between the two groups of 
firms with the Germany-specific model being the best example. More detailed, this 
model classifies correctly 69% of the non-repurchasing firms, and 63.60% of the 
share repurchasing firms. In the case of Specification 2, the out-of sample 
performance of the models is considerably worse in all cases, ranging from 56.53% 
(France) to 73.45% (pooled sample). Additionally, the models perform very pool in 
the case of Group 2 (i.e. repurchasing firms). Since Specification 1 has a significantly 
better predictive performance compared to Specification 2, as discussed earlier, we 
continue our analysis based on the classifications of Specification 1. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
4.2. BAHAR  
Table 4 reports the BAHAR for each one of the four models, estimated with 
Specification 1, for holding periods of 1 to 18 months.8 Panel A reports the portfolio 
BAHAR results for each country and the pooled sample returns. The pooled sample 
results show a modest positive abnormal return of approximately 1% that keeps 
                                                             
8
 For brevity we only present the results obtained from Specification 1. As expected, the results of 
Specification 2 have very poor performance due to the low specification accuracies in the holdout 
sample. Both the BAHAR and the Fama and MacBeth results for Specification 2 are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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increasing significantly during the following few months reaching approximately a 
6% excess return. Following the six-month holding period the portfolio performance 
reaches a plateau of approximately 4% up to the 12-month holding period, which then 
peaks at the 18 months with 8.63% excess returns. This result suggests that with a 
simple buy-and-hold strategy based on the predicted stocks, without rebalancing or 
categorizing the stocks held in the portfolio, yields a consistent positive and 
significant abnormal performance. This is consistent with the undervaluation 
hypothesis (Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995).  
Looking at the country-specific models, we observe that in most cases the 
proposed strategy generates positive and statistically significant abnormal returns. In 
particular, the portfolio holding only UK firms displays the lowest return which peaks 
on the first month at 1.55%, then remains stable at approximately 1% for the 
following six months and dissipates after the six-month holding period. Moreover, we 
find that the performance of the UK portfolio reverses after holding the portfolio for 
15 and 18 months with approximately -1.5% and -1.22% respectively. An explanation 
for the poor performance of the UK model is the large absolute number of non-share 
repurchasing shares that are misclassified as share repurchasing ones. More detailed, 
this model classifies correctly 86.2% of the non-share repurchasing shares, or in other 
words, it misclassifies around 13.8% of the non-share repurchasing shares as 
repurchasing ones. Given the large number of non-share repurchasing shares in the 
holdout sample for the UK, this means that 187 non-share repurchasing shares (i.e. 
13.8% of 1,353) are misclassified. Thus, a portfolio constructed on the basis of these 
predictions would include 217 shares from which only 30 shares (i.e. 76.9% of 39) 
would belong to firms that actually proceeded to a repurchase.9 Consequently, the 
                                                             
9
 This portfolio actually includes 213 firms due to missing values in four cases.  
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losses or small abnormal returns generated by the misclassified firms counterbalance 
any positive returns generated by the stocks of the correctly classified repurchasing 
firms. For example, a theoretical portfolio that would include only the UK 
repurchasing firms could generate abnormal returns between 2.76% (3 months) and 
8.82% (18 months).     
In contrast, Germany and especially France, yield significantly higher abnormal 
returns which remain positive consistently through each holding period up to 18 
months. In detail, the portfolio holding French firms yields a range of abnormal 
returns between 8.84% (3 months) to 31.76% (18 months). The corresponding figures 
for Germany are lower than France; however, they remain positive and statistically 
significant, with values ranging between 4.02% (3 months) and 8.06% (15 months). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
In addition, we split our portfolios based on firm growth (proxied by the market-
to-book ratio). The results are reported in Table 4 (Panel B) and show that overall the 
low growth firms generate consistently higher positive abnormal returns. A small 
exception to this though are the results for Germany where high-growth firms tend to 
generate higher returns during the shorter holding periods of up to three months, 
whereas afterwards they become quite volatile and produce significantly negative 
excess returns of -2.02% (12 months) contrary to the low-growth portfolio which 
generates 9.57% during the same holding period. Our results on the market-to-book 
classification are in line with Ikenberry et al. (1995) who find that value stocks (i.e. 
firms with high market-to-book ratio) significantly outperform growth stocks (i.e. 
firms with low market-to-book ratio). 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) show that small firms enjoy a significantly higher market 
reaction of approximately 8% compared to 2% for large firms, during the time of the 
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share buyback announcement. Therefore, we split our portfolios relative to firm size 
(proxied by total assets). The results reported in Table 4 (Panel C) show that for the 
pooled sample the small-firms portfolio consistently outperforms the large-firms 
portfolio for all holding periods up to 9 months, after which the pattern is reversed 
and large stocks outperform the small stocks in the longer run. This is also in line with 
Chan et al. (2004) who find that at the time of the announcement smaller firms enjoy a 
higher market reaction but on the long run (a four year holding period) it is large firms 
that have a better stock price performance. For the country-specific portfolios, we 
observe that in France, with the exception of the first month the small-stocks portfolio 
consistently outperforms the large stocks for all holding periods. In contrast, in the 
UK it is the large and mature firms that outperform the smaller stocks with the 
exception of the 1-month holding period. In Germany, the small stocks portfolio 
outperforms the large stocks for the first six months, after which the trend reverses 
and it is the large stocks that provide higher returns.  
 Finally, the results also reveal that even an investment strategy that ignores the 
country-specific attributes, by developing a common prediction model and a single 
portfolio, could also generate positive and statistically significant abnormal returns. 
However, these returns tend to be lower than the ones obtained through the country-
specific models for France and Germany, due to the cross-country regulatory, 
institutional and tax variations.   
4.3. Fama- MacBeth regressions 
In this section we follow the standard two-stage methodology of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) to assess whether the firm-specific characteristics employed for 
constructing the portfolios can explain the stock performance during the varying 
holding periods. In the first stage we run a number of time series regressions equal in 
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number to the number of firms identified by our model as repurchasing firms. The 
regressions are estimated as follows: 
ܴ௧௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௜ெܴ௧ெ ൅ ߳௧௜ (3) 
Where ܴ௧௜  is a vector of returns (t x 1),  ܴ௧ெ is a vector (t x 1) of industry returns based 
on the 2-digit industry classification code, ߚ଴  is the intercept, and ߚ௜ே  is the factor 
loading (beta). For each month t and each firm identified by our model as 
UHSXUFKDVLQJILUPZHXVHWKHILUPV¶DQGUHVSHFWLYHLQGXVWU\LQGH[UHWXUQVRYHUWKH
months (Jan:2002 ± Dec:2004) in order to identify the pre-ranking ߚ௜ேǤ Then firms are 
ranked each month based on their pre-ranking beta ߚ௜ே , into five equally weighted 
portfolios. The post-ranking factor loadings10 (betas) are estimated as follows: 
ܴ௧௣ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛ௣ெܴ௧ெ ൅ ߳௧௣  (4) 
where, ܴ௧௣ is the equal-weighted return for portfolio p in month t and this regression is 
run for each of the 12 months (Jan:2005 ± Dec:2005) prior to 2006. For the second 
step, following the estimation of equation 4, we run the following regression11 in 
order to test the drivers of the stock performance of the formed portfolios as follows:  
 ܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵǡ௧ߚ௜ ൅ ߛଶǡ௧ߚ௜ଶ ൅ ߛଷǡ௧ݏ௜ ൅ ߁݂݅ݎ݉݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߟ௜ǡ௧  (5) 
where, ܴ௜ǡ௧ is the one-period percentage return on security for each tested time 
interval t-1 to t (Jan:2006 ± Jun:2007). ߚ௜ and ߚ௜ଶ are the market coefficient and the 
squared market coefficient, respectively, and ݏ௜  is the standard deviation of the 
                                                             
10
 The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation based on Newey and West 
(1987).  
11
 We run alternative regressions of including only Ⱦ୧ǡ and alternatively only Ⱦ୧ and Ⱦ୧ଶ and the results 
remain qualitatively unaltered.  
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residual returns (߳௧௣ሻ from equation 4. Firm characteristics is a matrix of lagged firm-
specific variables as previously described in section 3.2.1.  
Table 5 reports the Fama MacBeth (1973) regression estimations based on the 
firm specific characteristics employed in specifications 1 and 2 respectively of the 
logistic regression, as discussed earlier in section 4.1. The results show that in the UK 
the average variability of standard errors (s) has a positive and significant explanatory 
power of the portfolio stock returns up to a 6-month holding period. In addition, the 
results show that ROA has small but negative relationship with the portfolio 
performance. The results also show that the payment of dividends has largely a 
negative relationship with the portfolio performance across most holding periods. 
Finally, in the case of the UK we find a strong and negative relationship between the 
performance of the portfolio for long-term holding periods and abnormal accruals, 
consistent with Gong et al. (2008). 
In France, we find that dividend and excess free cash flow explains the 
portfolio performance for most holding periods. This reflects WKHPDUNHW¶VVNHSWLFLVP
of tKHILUPV¶ potential for future growth as these firms accumulate more cash resulting 
to higher agency costs. In addition, the results that size and profitability have a 
positive and significant relationship with the portfolio performance across most 
holding periods. Finally, downward earnings management, captured by abnormal 
accruals, has a negative relationship with the portfolio performance but only for the 9-
month holding period.  
The results in Germany show that both ȕ2 and s explain the portfolio returns 
for the first 3 months of holding periodsZLWKȕ2 having a positive relationship with 
portfolio returns up to the 6-month holding period. In addition, the results show that 
the payment of dividends has a consistent negative relationship with portfolio 
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performance largely across all holding periods, while size has a positive relationship 
for the longer holding periods of 6 to 18 months. The results also show that excess 
free cash flow has a positive relationship with the portfolio performance from the 3-
month to the 18-month holding period. In addition, profitability has a negative 
relationship for the shorter holding periods but then reverses to a positive relationship 
for the longer holding periods. Finally, past returns appear to have a strong and 
positive relationship with the portfolio performance of the shorter 1- and 3-month 
holding periods.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Finally, the results from the portfolios comprised of all three countries show 
that the average standard deviation of standard errors (s) from the post-ranking 
portfolio estimations, has a positive and significant impact on the portfolio 
performance. This suggests that firms in our portfolios that have higher idiosyncratic 
risk perform better over the short-term holding period. In addition, we find that the 
payment of dividends and the holding of high levels of excess cash lead to a poor 
portfolio performance across almost all holding periods of our portfolios. In contrast, 
size has a positive and significant explanatory power suggesting that firms predicted 
by our model as repurchasing firms and are larger in size have a better stock market 
performance. Finally, we find that on the long-run those firms that have a good 
market performance in the past but have higher earnings management, captured by 
abnormal accruals, lead to a poor portfolio performance.  
5. Conclusions  
A number of studies document that open market share repurchase announcements are 
associated with positive abnormal returns in the short- and long-term horizon 
following the announcement of intention. Despite this fact, there are no studies testing 
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whether the ability to predict which firms are more likely to make an open market 
share buyback announcement, could form the basis for a successful investment 
strategy. The present study presented a first attempt to close this gap in the literature.   
Using a sample of 465 UK, French, and German firms that announced a share 
repurchase during 1997-2005, and an appropriate control group of non-repurchasing 
firms, we estimated four logistic regression models to predict the share repurchases. 
The estimated models were tested in holdout samples that correspond to the true 
population of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms in the three countries during 
2006. In each case, the shares of all the firms that the models identified as share-
repurchasing ones (correctly or not) were included in the corresponding portfolio.  
The average prediction ability of the models in the holdout sample was 
satisfactory ranging between 66.3% (Germany) and 81.55% (UK). The results show 
that by incorporating a cross-country or an individual-country portfolio it can lead to a 
successful investment strategy. Moreover, the portfolio performance varies among 
holding periods but significantly high returns can be gained between a modest 1.5% 
for 1-month in the UK and 31.76% for an 18-month holding period in France. Further, 
we employ alternative investment strategies by categorizing our portfolios based on 
size and growth which confirms our findings that statistically significant and positive 
excess returns can be realized. Finally, we employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology in order to investigate whether the efficient market hypothesis affects 
the performance of our portfolios. Overall, the results show that it is the average 
idiosyncratic risk of the post-ranking portfolios that has some explanatory power of 
our portfolio returns, while established firm-specific characteristics such as the 
payment of dividends, firm size, and excess cash have a strong explanatory ability on 
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the portfolio performance for those firms predicted as repurchasing firms by our 
models.  
Future research could extend the research presented in this study, in at least 
two ways. First, by incorporating corporate governance and management-specific 
attributes in the prediction models. This could potentially improve further the ability 
of the prediction models, in distinguishing between the two groups of firms. 
Unfortunately, such data were not available in our case. Second, by using alternative 
classification techniques, like support vector machines or neural networks.   
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Table 1: Composition of Samples and Correlation Matrices 
Panel A: Sample 
composition UK France Germany All countries 
Estimation Sample 
Non-
repurchasing 
firms 
Repurchasing 
firms 
Non-
repurchasing 
firms 
Repurchasing 
firms 
Non-
repurchasing 
firms 
Repurchasing 
firms 
Non-
repurchasing 
firms 
Repurchasing 
firms 
1997 8 8 1 1 0 0 9 9 
1998 16 16 14 14 0 0 33 33 
1999 14 14 16 16 8 8 38 38 
2000 13 13 26 26 18 18 57 57 
2001 21 21 13 13 30 30 58 58 
2002 31 31 25 25 23 23 79 79 
203 24 24 22 22 13 13 59 59 
2004 31 31 20 20 14 14 65 65 
2005 29 29 9 9 23 23 61 61 
Total Estimation Sample 190 190 146 146 129 129 465 465 
Holdout Sample ± 2006 1,353 39 452 30 480 22 2,285 91 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (Estimation Sample) 
 
 
Cash  
Flow 
FCF  
Dummy 
Dividend 
Payout 
Dividend 
Yield Leverage MKBK SIZE ROA KZ-index 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Prior 
returns 
U
n
ite
d 
K
in
gd
o
m
 
Cash Flow 1.000           
FCF Dummy 0.064 1.000          
Dividend Payout 0.043 0.071 1.000         
Dividend Yield 0.143** 0.041 0.106* 1.000        
Leverage -0.359** -0.016 0.035 0.027 1.000       
MKBK 0.004 0.031 -0.117* 0.001 -0.064 1.000      
SIZE 0.292** 0.162** 0.307** 0.250** 0.156** -0.031 1.000     
ROA 0.624** 0.044 0.058 0.204** -0.487** 0.035 0.301** 1.000    
KZ index -0.042 0.010 0.003 -0.001 -0.063 -0.121 -0.054 -0.081 1.000   
Abnormal accruals 0.427** -0.026 0.058 0.004 -0.027 -0.013 0.014 0.098 -0.037 1.000  
Prior returns -0.038 -.202* -0.014 -0.047 0.079 -.352** 0.049 0.013 0.094 0.009 1.000 
27 
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Cash Flow 1.000           
FCF Dummy 0.045 1.000          
Dividend Payout -0.030 0.165** 1.000         
Dividend Yield 0.069 -0.014 0.110 1.000        
Leverage -0.101 0.004 -0.048 -0.053 1.000       
MKBK -0.348** -0.065 -0.023 -0.047 -0.040 1.000      
SIZE 0.063 0.286** 0.399** 0.041 0.159** -0.077 1.000     
ROA 0.039 0.052 0.072 0.217** -0.090 -0.016 0.100 1.000    
KZ index -0.211 -0.022 0.176** -0.119 0.463** 0.372** 0.209 -0.114 1.000   
Abnormal accruals -0.149 -0.008 0.167 -0.029 0.087 0.078 0.308** 0.006 0.100 1.000  
Prior returns -0.220* -0.143 0.018 -0.174 0.164 0.173 -0.056 -0.177 0.328** -0.049 1.000 
G
er
m
an
y 
Cash Flow 1.000           
FCF Dummy 0.179** 1.000          
Dividend Payout 0.141* 0.002 1.000         
Dividend Yield -0.008 0.069 0.201** 1.000        
Leverage -0.001 0.176** 0.035 -0.002 1.000       
MKBK 0.069 -0.266** 0.094 0.065 -0.087 1.000      
SIZE 0.311** 0.350** 0.167** 0.162** 0.088 -0.063 1.000     
ROA 0.039 -0.067 0.092 0.376** -0.076 0.046 0.112 1.000    
KZ index -.407** 0.110 -0.004 -0.213 0.529** -0.12 0.142 -0.034 1.000   
Abnormal accruals 0.028 -0.095 -0.069 -0.025 -0.207 -0.477** 0.091 0.068 -0.024 1.000  
Prior returns -0.071 -0.044 -0.074 -0.176 0.114 -0.034 0.110 0.186 0.070 -0.101 1.000 
A
ll 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Cash Flow 1.000           
FCF Dummy 0.053 1.000          
Dividend Payout 0.023 0.090** 1.000         
Dividend Yield 0.089** 0.025 0.069* 1.000        
Leverage -0.296** 0.024 0.011 0.020 1.000       
MKBK -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.047 1.000      
SIZE 0.217** 0.241** 0.286** 0.180** 0.146** -0.049 1.000     
ROA 0.599** 0.029 0.046 0.172** -0.396** 0.024 0.222** 1.000    
KZ index -0.040 0.020 0.077 -0.078 0.124* -0.098 0.032 -0.063 1.000   
Abnormal accruals 0.220** -0.039 0.090 0.032 -0.033 -0.018 0.101 0.047 -0.019 1.000  
Prior returns -0.025 -0.141* 0.008 -0.138* 0.119 -0.256** 0.049 0 0.136* -0.035 1.000 
Note: This table reports sample-based basic statistics. Panel A report the annual sample composition for each country, between repurchasing and non-repurchasing 
firms. Panel B reports the correlation matrix of the independent variables used in this study. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***,**, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample 
 Non-repurchasing firms Repurchasing firms  
 United Kingdom 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kruskal 
±Wallis 
(p-values) 
Cash Flow -0.158 1.340 0.111 0.105 0.000** 
FCF Dummy 0.195 0.397 0.363 0.482 0.000** 
Dividend Payout 0.448 1.886 1.817 4.500 0.314 
Dividend Yield 2.043 2.338 3.315 2.798 0.000** 
Leverage 0.201 0.343 0.225 0.178 0.003** 
MKBK 2.473 8.503 1.124 18.073 0.493 
SIZE 11.271 2.524 14.092 2.531 0.000** 
ROA -0.128 0.677 0.034 0.159 0.000** 
KZ-index -0.159 2.056 -0.188 3.354 0.025** 
Abnormal accruals -0.045 0.035 -0.044 0.014 0.014** 
Prior returns -0.191 0.030 -0.191 0.0149 0.096* 
France    
Cash Flow 0.083   0.199   0.105   0.076   0.769 
FCF Dummy 0.178   0.384   0.363   0.483   0.000** 
Dividend Payout 0.168   1.026   8.311   13.428   0.000** 
Dividend Yield 1.695   2.114   1.709   1.631   0.132 
Leverage 0.222   0.180   0.220   0,144   0.616 
MKBK 5.202   27.714   3.013   3.378   0.106 
SIZE 11.166   1.818   14.094   2.312   0.000** 
ROA -0.002   0.148   0.028   0.097   0.741 
KZ- index 0.416 1.124 0.790 0.891 0.458 
Abnormal accruals -0.058 0.032 -0.051 0.0416 0.043* 
Prior returns -0.017 0.022 -0.012 0.018 0.727 
Germany    
Cash Flow 0.082 0.099 0.106 0.088 0.044* 
FCF Dummy 0.318 0.467 0.326 0.470 0.894 
Dividend Payout 0.373 1.340 1.103 2.669 0.025* 
Dividend Yield 1.408 1.703 1.577 1.625 0.224 
Leverage 0.190 0.170 0.138 0.140 0.066 
MKBK 2.621 2.224 2.941 2.180 0.056 
SIZE 11.653 1.811 13.197 2.251 0.000** 
ROA -0.009 0.101 0.026 0.084 0.002** 
KZ-index -0.135 2.188 0.509 0.923 0.113 
Abnormal accruals -0.057 0.024 -0.056 0.031 0.041* 
Prior returns -0.011 0.016 -0.006 0.011 0.204 
All countries    
Cash Flow -0.016 0.872 0.108 0,092 0.000** 
FCF Dummy 0.224 0.417 0.353 0,478 0.000** 
Dividend Payout 0.340 1.512 3.658 8,751 0.000** 
Dividend Yield 1.757 2.120 2.329 2,329 0.000** 
Leverage 0.205 0.257 0.200 0,162 0.241 
MKBK 3.371 16.504 2.221 11,780 0.157 
SIZE 11.344 2.138 13.844 2,416 0.000** 
ROA -0.056 0.447 0.030 0,124 0.000** 
KZ-index 0.304 1.847 0.269 2.429 0.919 
Abnormal accruals -0.051 0.033 -0.049 0.029 0.043* 
Prior returns -0.017 0.025 -0.014 0.016 0.887 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this study. The variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Logistic regression results 
Panel A Specification 1 Specification 2 
 
UK France Germany All 
countries UK France Germany 
All 
countries 
Cash Flow 
 
2.133* 
(0.054) 
1.563 
(0.366) 
-0.119 
(0.941) 
1.041 
(0.146) 
2.500 
(0.148) 
7.064 
(0.373) 
7.369 
(0.413) 
2.336 
(0.143) 
FCF Dummy 
 
0.648** 
(0.019) 
0.258 
(0.474) 
-0.356 
(0.303) 
0.132 
(0.450) 
0.027 
(0.951) 
2.298** 
(0.017) 
0.376 
(0.622) 
0.416 
(0.169) 
Dividend Payout 
 
0.029 
(0.475) 
0.345*** 
(0.003) 
0.145** 
(0.048) 
0.106*** 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.604) 
3.601** 
(0.044) 
0.394 
(0.111) 
0.126** 
(0.018) 
Dividend Yield 
 
0.087* 
(0.078) 
-0.176* 
(0.064) 
-0.141 
(0.141) 
0.015 
(0.668) 
-0.034 
(0.718) 
-0.312 
(0.209) 
-0.338 
(0.173) 
-0.050 
(0.472) 
Leverage 
 
-0.840 
(0.221) 
-0.812 
(0.436) 
-2.864*** 
(0.003) 
-1.618*** 
(0.001) 
-0.612 
(0.615) 
-4.324 
(0.203) 
-0.949 
(0.759) 
-1.431 
(0.129) 
MKBK 
 
-0.009 
(0.369) 
-0.001 
(0.958) 
0.048 
(0.473) 
-0.004 
(0.604) 
-0.003 
(0.793) 
0.022 
(0.926) 
0.192 
(0.530) 
0.002 
(0.866) 
SIZE 
 
0.422*** 
(0.000) 
0.587*** 
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
0.451*** 
(0.000) 
0.426*** 
(0.000) 
0.840* 
(0.001) 
0.529** 
(0.016) 
0.442* 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.394 
(0.499) 
1.640 
(0.234) 
3.880** 
(0.022) 
0.600 
(0.333) 
-0.578 
(0.564) 
5.972 
(0.428) 
8.824* 
(0.076) 
0.321 
(0.759) 
KZ-index 
 
 
   
0.096 
(0.160) 
0.234 
(0.658) 
0.369 
(0.322) 
0.110*** 
(0.079) 
Abnormal 
accruals 
 
   
-3.096 
(0.700) 
-10.953 
(0.512) 
3.022 
(0.838) 
-0.248 
(0.958) 
Prior returns 
 
 
   
-2.092 
(0.856) 
    66.470** 
(0.016) 
32.490 
(0.295) 
11.429 
(0.191) 
Constant -5.782*** 
(0.000) 
-7.464*** 
(0.000) 
-4.825*** 
(0.000) 
-5.613*** 
(0.000) 
-5.580*** 
(0.000) 
-12.196*** 
(0.003) 
-8.002** 
(0.020) 
-5.810* 
(0.000) 
Pseudo - R2 37.40 54.10 27.50 36.20 30.7 76.00 44.50 36.40 
Obs.-Estimation 380 292 258 930 130 84 55 269 
Obs.-Holdout  1,392 482 502 2,376 719 384 349 1,452 
 
Panel B Classification and Predictive Accuracies 
Estimation sample (%)  
          Group 1 70.53 83.6 67.4 76.6 66.10 90.50 70.40 72.52 
   Group 2 75.79 75.3 64.3 69.2 75.00 88.10 78.60 73.2 
   Average 73.16 79.45 65.85 72.9 70.55 89.30 74.50 72.9 
Holdout sample (%)  
          Group 1 86.18 77.7 69 83.3 87.60 90.10 38.50 81.00 
   Group 2 76.92 70 63.6 71.4 28.20 13.30 86.40 59.30 
   Average 81.55 73.85 66.3 77.35 57.90 51.70 62.45 70.15 
Notes: This table presents results from the logit regressions for each country and for the pooled-samples (all-
countries). The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one for firms that make a share repurchase 
announcements and zero otherwise, over the period 1997 to 2006. Financial firms are excluded from the samples. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A reports the logit-model coefficient estimate. The p-values of 
the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the respective classification accuracies of each 
logit specification. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 43RUWIROLRV¶3HUIRUPDQFH± Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns  
Panel A Holding Periods (in months) Total sample 
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
UK 1.55%
***
 1.02%*** 1.28%*** 0.94%*** 0.09% 0.22% -1.47%*** -1.22%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.348) (0.148) (0.000) (0.000) 
France 0.77%
***
 7.72%*** 8.84%*** 14.68%*** 11.39%*** 12.34%*** 17.58%*** 31.76%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.87%
***
 3.46%*** 4.12%*** 6.14%*** 5.88%*** 3.92%*** 8.06%*** 4.51%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
All 
countries 
1.14%*** 3.43%*** 4.02%*** 5.93%*** 4.68%*** 4.34%*** 6.19%*** 8.63%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Panel B Above median MKBK 
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
UK 1.15%
***
 1.39%*** 1.09%*** 0.48%*** -1.54%*** -3.98%*** -6.36%*** -5.09%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
France 2.50%
***
 4.84%*** 5.05%*** 5.35%*** 1.55%*** 0.291% 2.24%*** 0.37% 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591) (0.000) (0.551) 
Germany 0.36%
**
 5.04%*** 6.90%*** 6.14%*** 1.97%*** -2.02%*** 4.86%*** 0.64% 
(0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.511) 
All 
countries 
1.26%*** 3.24%*** 3.73%*** 3.28%*** 0.07% -2.86%*** -1.30%*** -2.69%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Below median MKBK 
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
UK 1.94%
***
 0.66%*** 1.46%*** 1.39%*** 1.71%*** 4.39%*** 3.38%*** 2.61%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
France -0.96%
***
 10.60%*** 12.64%*** 24.01%*** 21.24%*** 24.38%*** 32.92%*** 63.15%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 1.35%
***
 1.96%*** 1.49%*** 6.14%*** 9.60%*** 9.57%*** 11.10%*** 8.20%*** 
(0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
All 
countries 
1.05%*** 3.47%*** 4.16%*** 8.37%*** 8.96%*** 10.87%*** 12.98%*** 18.99%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Panel C Above Median Size 
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
UK 1.08%
***
 1.02%*** 1.76%*** 1.23%*** 2.21%*** 5.60%*** 6.99%*** 6.04%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
France 2.22%
***
 3.63%*** 5.61%*** 6.14%*** 5.01%*** 5.39%*** 6.69%*** 3.13%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.11% 1.01%
***
 0.24% 4.01%*** 7.40%*** 11.24%*** 14.81%*** 16.78%*** 
(0.420) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
All 
countries 
1.05%*** 1.65%*** 2.23%*** 3.31%*** 4.53%*** 7.33%*** 9.38%*** 8.72%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Below Median Size 
 1m 2m 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
UK 2.01%
***
 1.02%*** 0.80%*** 0.64%*** -2.01%*** -5.10%*** -9.85%*** -8.42%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
France -0.68%
***
 11.82%*** 12.07%*** 23.22%*** 17.78%*** 19.28%*** 28.47%*** 60.40%*** 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 1.61%
***
 5.85%*** 7.90%*** 8.22%*** 4.40%*** -3.21%*** 1.49%* -7.44%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) 
All 
countries 
1.23%*** 5.18%*** 5.79%*** 8.53%*** 4.83%*** 1.40%*** 3.04%*** 8.54%*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: This table presents the buy and hold abnormal returns, across a number of holding monthly-periods (m), of portfolios that 
are constructed incorporating the predictions of the respective logistic regression models of Specification 1. Specification 1 
includes the following variables: Cash Flow, FCF Dummy, Dividend Payout, Dividend Yield, Leverage, MKBK, SIZE, ROA. All 
investment strategies have inception date the 2nd of January 2006. p-values are in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions 
 
United Kingdom 
 
1m 3m 6m 9m 12m 18m 
ȕ 0.058 0.097* 0.257 0.170 0.023 0.207 0.190 0.037 0.304 -0.051 0.208 -0.083 
 
(0.476) (1.791) (1.375) (1.608) (0.101) (1.473) (0.723) (0.260) (0.689) (-0.299) (0.385) (-0.376) 
ȕ2 -0.025 -0.091** -0.184 -0.166*** 0.054 -0.140 -0.134 0.006 -0.213 0.078 -0.027 0.185 
 
(-0.253) (-2.317) (-1.092) (-2.649) (0.260) (-1.541) (-0.574) (0.065) (-0.543) (0.633) (-0.061) (1.160) 
s 3.609** 5.486** 5.150** 12.232** 6.546** 11.589* 3.943 0.372 2.090 -2.870 10.649 -4.587 
 
(2.027) (2.415) (1.981) (2.601) (1.975) (1.885) (0.989) (0.050) (0.331) (-0.308) (1.294) (-0.376) 
Cash Flow 0.005 0.061 0.150 -0.095 0.262 -0.071 0.160 0.957*** 0.097 0.611 0.400 0.930 
 
(0.049) (0.408) (0.906) (-0.387) (1.240) (-0.217) (0.752) (2.657) (0.252) (1.203) (0.779) (1.634) 
FCF Dummy 0.000 -0.005 -0.007 0.017 -0.030 0.060 -0.045 0.005 -0.028 0.060 -0.062 0.053 
 
(-0.026) (-0.226) (-0.364) (0.436) (-1.166) (1.067) (-1.464) (0.074) (-0.544) (0.803) (-0.999) (0.498) 
Div Payout 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.005* -0.004 
 
(3.209) (3.634) (0.221) (0.095) (-0.241) (0.256) (-0.096) (0.338) (-0.704) (0.065) (-1.682) (-0.811) 
Div Yield -0.004** -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.014* -0.004 -0.033* -0.057** -0.036 -0.032 
 
(-2.111) (-0.760) (-1.500) (-0.336) (-1.102) (-0.654) (-1.731) (-0.147) (-1.721) (-1.990) (-1.445) (-0.786) 
Leverage -0.047 0.000 -0.144** 0.063 -0.174** -0.019 -0.128 -0.007 0.038 0.536 -0.094 0.614 
 
(-1.340) (-0.001) (-2.270) (0.367) (-2.098) (-0.077) (-1.527) (-0.029) (0.285) (1.584) (-0.604) (1.573) 
MKBK -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.007* 0.000 0.013** 0.000 0.014* 0.000 0.022** 0.000 0.017 
 
(-1.646) (0.928) (-0.061) (1.785) (0.526) (2.023) (0.529) (1.757) (-0.240) (2.026) (-0.056) (1.527) 
Size -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.020 0.012 0.011 0.019 0.022 0.033 0.021 
 
(-0.188) (0.902) (0.652) (1.389) (1.195) (1.464) (1.069) (0.735) (1.260) (1.173) (1.547) (0.846) 
ROA 0.036 0.012 -0.248 0.095 -0.501** -0.062 -0.497** -1.015*** -0.682 -0.656 -1.190* -1.048** 
 
(0.316) (0.092) (-1.444) (0.433) (-2.239) (-0.217) (-2.056) (-2.974) (-1.349) (-1.438) (-1.753) (-2.022) 
KZ Index -0.204 0.000 -0.336 -0.017 -0.565* -0.029 -0.304 -0.010 -0.198 -0.082 -0.991 -0.104** 
 
(-1.235) (-0.029) (-1.355) (-0.831) (-1.767) (-0.938) (-0.806) (-0.278) (-0.347) (-1.573) (-1.300) (-2.035) 
Abnormal   -0.010  -0.040  -0.138  -0.243**  -0.268*  -0.276* 
   Accruals  (-0.222)  (-0.466)  (-1.388)  (-2.448)  (-1.918)  (-1.691) 
Past returns  0.253  3.861  1.682  -0.099  0.231  3.799 
  (0.228)  (1.491)  (0.443)  (-0.025)  (0.053)  (0.644) 
Constant  -0.424**  -0.992**  -1.136**  -0.309  -0.168  -0.108 
  (-2.474)  (-2.583)  (-2.286)  (-0.482)  (-0.206)  (-0.097) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Obs. 213 95 213 95 213 95 213 95 213 95 213 95 
Adj. R2(%) 1.30 2.23 0.24 1.38 3.13 1.67 4.25 2.69 8.61 6.61 9.49 4.86 
Notes: This table presents the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the UK-stocks portfolio. The regressions estimation results are computed for stock returns of various holding periods (each 
column indicates the relevant holding period in months) on the explanatory variables as described in Appendix 1. All investment strategies have inception date the 2nd of January 2006. In addition, the 
regressions include ߚ௜  and ߚ௜ଶ, the market coefficient and the squared market coefficient, respectively, and ݏ௜  which is the standard deviation of the residual returns (߳௧௣ሻ, estimated in the post-ranking 
portfolio regressions (equation 4). The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 continued.  
 
France 
 
1m 3m 6m 9m 12m 18m 
ȕ -0.105 -0.046 -0.542 -0.227 -0.693 -0.297 -0.595 -0.578*** -0.565 -0.512* -0.539 -0.411 
 
(-0.715) (-0.392) (-1.123) (-1.631) (-1.095) (-1.562) (-0.922) (-3.052) (-0.812) (-2.016) (-0.602) (-1.479) 
ȕ2 0.022 -0.007 0.423 -0.039 0.500 -0.092 0.273 -0.091 0.306 -0.065 0.214 -0.101 
 
(0.147) (-0.286) (0.857) (-1.057) (0.776) (-1.431) (0.418) (-1.436) (0.437) (-0.932) (0.237) (-1.163) 
s -1.114 0.721 -3.138 -0.792 -2.364 1.626 -3.116 -2.505 -0.831 -0.500 1.757 0.971 
 
(-0.874) (0.318) (-1.289) (-0.240) (-0.738) (0.272) (-0.906) (-0.416) (-0.214) (-0.086) (0.340) (0.126) 
Cash Flow -0.042 -1.461*** -0.439 -0.955 -0.399 -1.118 -0.425 -1.068 -0.294 -1.953 -0.694 -1.324 
 
(-0.238) (-3.258) (-1.131) (-1.679) (-0.644) (-1.345) (-0.643) (-1.241) (-0.460) (-1.575) (-0.720) (-1.158) 
FCF Dummy -0.034* 0.014 -0.046 0.039 -0.090* 0.009 -0.090* 0.013 -0.137** 0.030 -0.131* -0.054 
 
(-1.862) (0.400) (-1.254) (0.698) (-1.946) (0.091) (-1.871) (0.139) (-2.423) (0.284) (-1.814) (-0.410) 
Div Payout -0.002** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008** -0.007** -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011** -0.006** 
 
(-2.032) (-1.279) (-1.124) (-1.126) (-2.386) (-2.635) (-1.498) (-1.212) (-1.573) (-1.505) (-2.364) (-2.645) 
Div Yield -0.019*** -0.006 -0.046*** -0.007 -0.046** 0.002 -0.043** -0.006 -0.059*** -0.017 -0.047* 0.000 
 
(-2.858) (-0.560) (-3.228) (-0.425) (-2.515) (0.071) (-2.281) (-0.283) (-2.697) (-0.574) (-1.733) (0.012) 
Leverage 0.042 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.075 0.016 0.047 -0.064 -0.083 -0.197 -0.079 -0.280 
 
(0.890) (0.673) (0.463) (0.355) (0.693) (0.090) (0.294) (-0.427) (-0.415) (-1.213) (-0.305) (-1.326) 
MKBK 0.007 0.001*** -0.007 0.001* -0.019 0.001 -0.025 0.001 -0.032 0.000 -0.044 0.001 
 
(1.113) (3.559) (-0.717) (2.013) (-1.460) (1.101) (-1.402) (0.976) (-1.420) (-0.068) (-1.352) (0.758) 
Size 0.013** 0.032*** 0.011 0.027* 0.007 0.017 0.023 0.025 0.033 0.044* 0.029 0.031 
 
(2.281) (4.245) (0.771) (2.031) (0.362) (0.813) (1.118) (1.251) (1.530) (1.835) (1.059) (1.076) 
ROA 0.150 1.854*** 1.347 1.514* 1.527 2.062 1.950 2.530* 1.705 3.945** 2.178 2.741 
 
(1.010) (3.131) (1.612) (1.838) (1.206) (1.565) (1.506) (1.947) (1.374) (2.357) (1.198) (1.664) 
KZ Index 0.004 -0.025 0.360 -0.021 0.377 -0.046 0.248 -0.061 0.100 -0.018 0.199 -0.016 
 
(0.032) (-0.864) (1.082) (-0.489) (0.860) (-0.709) (0.540) (-1.109) (0.196) (-0.284) (0.304) (-0.233) 
Abnormal   -0.094  -0.128  -0.191  -0.318*  -0.224  -0.296 
   Accruals  (-1.308)  (-1.151)  (-1.092)  (-2.063)  (-1.397)  (-1.608) 
Past returns  -3.218  -0.723  1.625  5.476  1.324  5.950 
  (-1.399)  (-0.207)  (0.354)  (1.290)  (0.272)  (0.845) 
Constant  -0.326  -0.009  0.059  0.423  0.049  0.312 
  (-1.556)  (-0.029)  (0.125)  (0.873)  (0.084)  (0.486) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Obs. 118 39 118 39 118 39 118 39 118 39 118 39 
Adj. R2(%) 12.90 69.91 13.42 45.49 12.68 6.96 13.23 20.53 13.25 17.52 6.97 17.11 
Notes: This table presents the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the French-stocks portfolio. The regressions estimation results are computed for stock returns of various holding periods (each 
column indicates the relevant holding period in months) on the explanatory variables as described in Appendix 1. All investment strategies have inception date the 2nd of January 2006. In addition, the 
regressions include ߚ௜  and ߚ௜ଶ, the market coefficient and the squared market coefficient, respectively, and ݏ௜  which is the standard deviation of the residual returns (߳௧௣ሻ, estimated in the post-ranking 
portfolio regressions (equation 4). The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 continued. 
 
Germany 
 
1m 3m 6m 9m 12m 18m 
ȕ 0.230** 0.223** 0.357** 0.294** 0.074 0.327* -0.216 0.293 -0.363 0.320 -0.579 0.322 
 
(2.398) (2.529) (2.114) (2.087) (0.311) (1.759) (-0.768) (1.258) (-0.986) (1.295) (-0.991) (1.088) 
ȕ2 -0.359** -0.087 -0.667*** 0.051 -0.418 -0.121 0.040 -0.081 0.233 -0.070 0.357 -0.101 
 
(-2.504) (-0.470) (-2.719) (0.173) (-1.211) (-0.315) (0.097) (-0.162) (0.446) (-0.132) (0.436) (-0.161) 
s 3.635** 0.401 6.739** 0.992 2.353 -0.008 -1.260 0.940 -3.865 1.972 -5.555 0.792 
 
(2.279) (0.322) (2.500) (0.492) (0.609) (-0.003) (-0.281) (0.291) (-0.661) (0.530) (-0.593) (0.180) 
Cash Flow -0.089 -0.002 0.231* 0.019*** 0.302* 0.015*** 0.492** 0.019** 0.255 0.026*** 0.159 0.027*** 
 
(-0.833) (-0.861) (1.893) (4.886) (1.694) (2.637) (2.553) (2.571) (0.673) (4.355) (0.290) (3.909) 
FCF Dummy -0.001 -0.007 -0.045 -0.036 -0.032 -0.031 -0.081 -0.078** -0.042 -0.085* 0.075 0.011 
 
(-0.049) (-0.427) (-1.433) (-1.452) (-0.797) (-1.015) (-1.518) (-2.069) (-0.718) (-1.883) (0.928) (0.180) 
Div Payout -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 
(-2.139) (-0.952) (-2.630) (-1.954) (-2.086) (-0.319) (-2.714) (-0.724) (-2.328) (-1.251) (-2.250) (-1.245) 
Div Yield -0.009 0.003 -0.026** -0.008 -0.019 -0.021* -0.038** -0.041*** -0.038** -0.040*** -0.038 -0.056*** 
 
(-1.510) (0.462) (-2.599) (-0.885) (-1.373) (-1.778) (-2.470) (-3.020) (-1.979) (-2.740) (-1.581) (-2.819) 
Leverage -0.040 -0.133* -0.263** -0.167* -0.162 -0.228* -0.102 -0.061 -0.046 -0.062 -0.304 -0.125 
 
(-0.486) (-1.928) (-2.121) (-1.839) (-0.955) (-1.884) (-0.583) (-0.433) (-0.197) (-0.376) (-0.957) (-0.453) 
MKBK -0.001 0.003* 0.003 0.008*** -0.001 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 
 
(-0.821) (1.703) (0.811) (2.702) (-0.279) (1.542) (-1.589) (-0.599) (-1.511) (-0.917) (-0.369) (-0.913) 
Size 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.021** 0.027* 0.041*** 0.039** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 
 
(0.240) (0.941) (0.754) (0.977) (0.408) (2.235) (1.728) (4.161) (2.400) (4.506) (3.198) (4.980) 
ROA 0.086 0.069 -0.245** -0.015 -0.305* 0.321 -0.471** 0.532 -0.227 0.602*** -0.125 0.786*** 
 
(0.807) (0.750) (-2.056) (-0.105) (-1.714) (1.381) (-2.473) (1.647) (-0.605) (2.707) (-0.232) (3.141) 
KZ Index -0.197 0.007 -0.401 0.004 -0.030 0.019* 0.027 -0.010 0.171 -0.005 0.012 -0.005 
 
(-1.184) (1.075) (-1.607) (0.565) (-0.080) (1.951) (0.066) (-0.828) (0.336) (-0.331) (0.016) (-0.222) 
Abnormal   0.027  0.056  -0.025  0.011  -0.009  0.044 
   Accruals  (0.766)  (1.049)  (-0.338)  (0.153)  (-0.108)  (0.450) 
Past returns  2.689**  4.485**  -0.279  0.546  0.986  1.313 
  (2.095)  (2.324)  (-0.120)  (0.179)  (0.266)  (0.263) 
Constant  -0.037  -0.085  -0.142  -0.451  -0.625  -0.683 
  (-0.176)  (-0.246)  (-0.308)  (-0.878)  (-1.099)  (-1.028) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Obs. 154 220 154 220 154 220 154 220 154 220 154 220 
Adj. R2(%) 4.16 9.53 9.92 14.64 -2.15 4.62 1.02 7.47 0.25 8.63 1.21 9.77 
Notes: This table presents the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the German-stocks portfolio. The regressions estimation results are computed for stock returns of various holding periods (each 
column indicates the relevant holding period in months) on the explanatory variables as described in Appendix 1. All investment strategies have inception date the 2nd of January 2006. In addition, the 
regressions include ߚ௜  and ߚ௜ଶ, the market coefficient and the squared market coefficient, respectively, and ݏ௜  which is the standard deviation of the residual returns (߳௧௣ሻ, estimated in the post-ranking 
portfolio regressions (equation 4). The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 continued. 
 
All Countries 
 
1m 3m 6m 9m 12m 18m 
ȕ 0.510 -0.086 1.520 -0.100 1.509 -0.204 0.607 -0.122 -1.004 -0.203 -3.100 -0.070 
 
(1.140) (-0.947) (1.622) (-0.691) (1.195) (-0.973) (0.412) (-0.542) (-0.537) (-0.731) (-1.336) (-0.172) 
ȕ2 -0.584 0.064 -1.841 0.104 -1.969 0.224 -0.901 0.163 1.249 0.296 3.792 0.042 
 
(-0.980) (0.868) (-1.442) (0.864) (-1.151) (1.267) (-0.453) (0.867) (0.495) (1.279) (1.225) (0.119) 
s 3.708* -0.209 8.719** 0.764 7.329 0.978 3.790 2.532** -3.324 3.167** -10.739 3.581* 
 
(1.817) (-0.397) (2.290) (0.996) (1.415) (0.862) (0.617) (2.033) (-0.430) (1.969) (-1.059) (1.670) 
Cash Flow -0.047 -0.002 0.026 0.019*** 0.074 0.004 0.133 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.012* 
 
(-0.701) (-1.138) (0.203) (6.721) (0.570) (0.725) (0.936) (-0.262) (-0.025) (-0.234) (-0.018) (-1.694) 
FCF Dummy -0.020** -0.015 -0.044*** -0.019 -0.061*** -0.031 -0.074*** -0.051* -0.059* -0.040 -0.050 -0.017 
 
(-2.090) (-1.416) (-2.707) (-1.069) (-2.899) (-1.244) (-3.002) (-1.921) (-1.746) (-1.126) (-1.112) (-0.346) 
Div Payout -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 
(-5.477) (-2.484) (-5.760) (-4.305) (-3.737) (-3.334) (-3.581) (-3.814) (-3.810) (-4.403) (-2.849) (-3.843) 
Div Yield -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.016** -0.023** -0.020** -0.037*** -0.035** -0.060*** -0.041* -0.072*** 
 
(-3.493) (-2.877) (-2.734) (-3.929) (-2.116) (-2.179) (-2.300) (-3.462) (-2.318) (-4.165) (-1.948) (-3.807) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.009 -0.071* -0.016 -0.048 -0.121 -0.046 -0.125 -0.027 -0.063 -0.109 -0.174 
 
(-0.419) (-0.279) (-1.883) (-0.333) (-0.930) (-1.561) (-0.876) (-1.507) (-0.329) (-0.566) (-1.192) (-1.164) 
MKBK -0.001** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** -0.002 0.001*** -0.003 0.001*** -0.003 0.001*** 
 
(-2.349) (24.048) (-0.156) (20.998) (-0.583) (8.956) (-1.188) (6.456) (-1.560) (3.716) (-1.313) (6.213) 
Size 0.000 0.008** -0.001 0.015** 0.004 0.011 0.016** 0.023** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.052*** 0.042** 
 
(-0.011) (2.176) (-0.126) (2.129) (0.540) (1.278) (2.013) (2.368) (3.087) (2.012) (3.526) (2.310) 
ROA 0.040 0.073* -0.049 -0.046 -0.087 -0.082 -0.133 -0.091 0.008 -0.247 0.018 -0.459* 
 
(0.600) (1.931) (-0.385) (-0.582) (-0.676) (-0.407) (-0.961) (-0.652) (0.038) (-1.596) (0.058) (-1.708) 
KZ Index -0.273 -0.001 -0.670* -0.007** -0.636 -0.007 -0.378 -0.009 0.240 -0.015 0.882 -0.011 
 
(-1.313) (-0.482) (-1.766) (-2.342) (-1.256) (-1.229) (-0.613) (-1.521) (0.318) (-1.465) (0.922) (-0.781) 
Abnormal   0.011  0.014  -0.060**  -0.079**  -0.127***  -0.112** 
   Accruals  (0.931)  (0.652)  (-2.055)  (-2.542)  (-3.047)  (-2.072) 
Past returns  0.710***  0.188  -0.242  -2.060***  -2.277***  -2.035*** 
  (5.656)  (0.594)  (-0.655)  (-4.229)  (-4.915)  (-2.725) 
Constant  -0.007  -0.070  -0.039  -0.266  -0.214  -0.288 
  (-0.091)  (-0.599)  (-0.225)  (-1.344)  (-0.854)  (-0.874) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Obs. 485 312 485 312 485 312 485 312 485 312 485 312 
Adj. R2(%) 4.00 23.05 5.53 16.75 2.77 6.41 3.85 12.14 5.82 11.53 5.96 9.94 
Notes: This table presents the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the stock portfolio from all three countries. The regressions estimation results are computed for stock returns of various holding 
periods (each column indicates the relevant holding period in months) on the explanatory variables as described in Appendix 1. All investment strategies have inception date the 2nd of January 2006. In 
addition, the regressions include ߚ௜  and ߚ௜ଶ, the market coefficient and the squared market coefficient, respectively, and ݏ௜  which is the standard deviation of the residual returns (߳௧௣ሻ, estimated in the post-
ranking portfolio regressions (equation 4). The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1 ± Definition of independent variables used in the logistic regression models 
Variable Definition 
Cash Flow 
 
 
It is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and depreciation to 
total assets. 
FCF Dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
A binary variable that takes the value of one for firms that have 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ ORZ 7RELQ¶V q (lower than the median q of a ILUP¶V
respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher 
than the median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and 
the value of zero otherwise 
Dividend Payout 
 
It is the ratio of total cash dividends relative to net income. 
Dividend Yield 
 
 
Is the ratio of total cash dividends relative to the year-end share price.  
Leverage 
 
It is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
MKBK 
 
 
It is the ratio of market value relative to the book value of equity.  
SIZE 
 
It is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA 
 
It is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
KZ-index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraint, as 
estimated in Chen and Wang (2012). In particular, the KZ-index is 
estimated as KZ=-1.002(Cash Flow over Total Assets ± lagged) ± 
39.368(Total Cash Dividends over Total Assets ± lagged) ± 1.315(Cash 
Balances over Total Assets ± lagged) + 3.139(Total Debt over Total 
Assets ± lagged) + 0.283 (Market-to-Book value). In addition, the 
components of the KZ-index are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
Abnormal accruals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abnormal accruals are estimated as in Gong et al. (2008). In particular, 
abnormal accruals are the residuals of regressing Total Accruals against 
the change in Sales, Property Plant and Equipment, and Total Assets; 
while Total Accruals (TA) are estimated as TA=Change in Current 
Assets ± Change in Current Liabilities ± Change in Cash + Change in 
Debt included in current Liabilities ± Depreciation and Amortization 
Expense. 
Prior returns 
 
It is estimated as the 6-month (days -151 to 2 days) market-adjusted 
stock returns. 
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